Once a new technology has been invented, there is a credible threat of imitation when patent protection is strong and imitation cost is low. Within the area of credible imitation, the innovator has an incentive to postpone technology adoption when the cost of imitation is relatively high. The possibility of licensing, however, eliminates or at least reduces the incentive for delayed technology adoption and may increase or decrease social welfare. Further, this paper explains the possibility of a forward contract on licensing.
Introduction
Imitation of new technologies plays an important role when R&D is costly and patent protection is imperfect. Theoretical 1 and empirical 2 literature on intellectual property rights have addressed this issue. One of the most important results within this literature concerns the free rider problem of an entrant that copies the technology. Anticipating imitation, an innovating firm will generally underinvest in new technologies. In contrast to previous work, this paper explains underinvestment in new technologies not as the choice to innovate or not, but as the choice to adopt a new technology now or later. In a dynamic model in which the lifecycle of a new technology is limited, it is shown under which combinations of patent length and cost of imitation an incumbent firm has an incentive to delay technology adoption.
Thus, this paper extends the literature on delayed innovation (Katz and Shapiro, 1987 ) and delayed technology adoption (Choi and Thum, 1998) . While Katz and Shapiro (1987) have focused on the possibility of reduction in the cost of technology development,
Choi and Thum (1998) have concentrated on network externality to examine the delay in innovation and technology adoption respectively. This paper shows a new effect, i.e. delayed technology adoption in order to eliminate the threat of imitation. Further, while Choi and Thum (1998) have considered delayed technology adoption from the consumer's point of view, this paper explains delayed technology adoption from the producer's point of view.
Since we abstract from the possibility of maintaining the technology secret 3 unless the incumbent firm decides to delay technology adoption, there is nothing the incumbent can do to prevent imitation by an entrant when imitation costs are relatively low. Further, when imitation cost is very high, the entrant has no incentive to copy. Hence, for these imitation costs the incumbent has no incentive to delay technology adoption. But, for intermediate 1 Early explicit modeling of imitation started with Benoit (1985) . 2 Empirical documentation of imitation costs and patents is given in Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) , and Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987) . A recent overview on the benefits and costs of patent protection is given by Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) . levels of imitation costs, delay is an optimal strategy to prevent imitation. However, the range of imitation costs for which each strategy is optimal appears to depend critically on the level of patent protection. Thus, taking into account a positive relationship between product complexity and imitation cost 4 , this outcome predicts especially underinvestment in technologies with moderate complexity.
This paper builds upon Gallini (1992) who proposes a model where imitators can invent around the patent at a certain cost. From a welfare perspective she shows that short patents are optimal. Our model extends her analysis by introducing both licensing and strategic postponement of technology adoption as instruments to discourage imitation. Thus, this paper proposes a new strategic effect of a patent system at the time of technology adoption. Hence, while considering the costs and benefits of a patent regime on the incentive for innovation, one should be careful about the possibility of strategic postponement.
We analyze the implications for welfare and extend the earlier results by Deardorff (1992) and Gallini (1992) suggesting a negative relation between patent protection and welfare. The possibility of delay in technology adoption reduces welfare even more when imitation cost is not too low. The reason for this result is that delay in technology adoption as to prevent imitation leads to a later realization of payoffs and to monopolization, and thus to a reduction in consumer surplus. When imitation cost is low, welfare may increase because imitation creates competition.
Furthermore, the paper extends the literature on licensing and R&D (see, e.g., Shapiro, 1985, 1987) by analyzing the impact on the postponement strategy of an ordinary licensing contract and a forward contract on licensing. We show that licensing is a strategy superior to delayed technology adoption if licensing involves a forward contract.
Moreover, the forward contract on licensing increases welfare in the whole range of imitation 3 Takalo (1998) shows that keeping the innovation secret is optimal when imitation is likely to be successful and patent life is long. 4 Pepall and Richards (1994) find a positive relation between product quality and imitation cost. We suppose that higher quality products involve more complex technologies.
cost where the incumbent would delay if licensing were not feasible. Since immediate technology adoption and licensing is optimal in the high cost of imitation area, the production in all periods and instantaneous duopoly in the later stages increase consumer surplus. But, in situations where the incumbent will not delay technology adoption without licensing, a forward contract on licensing can reduce welfare by creating monopoly in the initial periods.
However, in the absence of a forward contract, licensing does not Pareto-dominate a delaying strategy for cost of imitation that is relatively high, though not high enough to make imitation incredible. For this range of imitation costs (a relatively short) delayed technology adoption is still optimal. Thus, we find that, in the absence of a forward contract, an ordinary licensing contract helps to reduce the range of imitation costs over which a delaying strategy is optimal.
Though the topics are treated from a theoretical viewpoint, the industries that we are considering are within the new economy where lifecycles are short and imitation cost is relatively low. For example Priceline.Com, which developed an E-commerce system in which buyers indicate the price they are willing to pay for a product (e.g. airline tickets), states that "it won't be easy […] to enforce its patent against the legal firepower of firms like Microsoft and AOL." 5 And indeed shortly after the introduction Priceline.Com started a lawsuit against Microsoft claiming that it was copying its technology. The paper predicts that licensing deals may make everyone better off when imitation is easy. So, it is reasonable to understand the company's next step in which it set up licensing deals with other potential copiers, for example, Budget Rent A Car Corporation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of imitation and patent protection without the possibility of licensing. In Section 3 we extend the basic model with licensing and perform comparative statics with respect to the lifetime of the new technology. Section 4 discusses for a possible extension of the basic model. Finally, Section 5 concludes the article. 5 Quoted from The Economist, August 15, 1998.
Model
Suppose there are two firms. Label these firms as incumbent and entrant. Assume that the incumbent has the knowledge about a basic technology whereas the entrant does not have this knowledge (cf. Benoit, 1985) . Furthermore, assume that the incumbent gets a patent protection of length P once it brings or adopts the technology. After technology adoption by the incumbent, the entrant can imitate or invent around the technology to incorporate the basic knowledge. Such imitation costs the entrant a fixed amount denoted by I . However, once the patent has expired, i.e. after time P , the entrant has free access to the technology. We assume that the entrant would have free access to the technology once the incumbent decides to adopt if there were no patent protection. Therefore, it is always optimal for the incumbent to take the patent when adopting its technology.
Suppose that the lifecycle of the technology ranges from time 0 to N 6 , and that the common discount rate is given by r . The invented technology, if used by a single firm only, yields a flow of profit M to that firm. In the case of imitation, both firms can produce the good with the technology and each firm gets a flow of profit M D < .
No credible threat of imitation
Assume that the incumbent adopts its technology at time A . If the entrant imitates the technology and competes with the incumbent then the market will be a duopoly as of this period. 7 In that case, the net discounted lifetime payoff to the entrant is
On the other hand, if the entrant does not imitate the incumbent's technology then it can produce only when the patent expires. Then the discounted lifetime payoffs to the entrant are 6 N is assumed to be non-random, but results easily carry over to the case where N follows an exponential distribution, and the firms are risk-neutral. 7 If the entrant imitates the technology then it will do so at the time of the adoption by the incumbent. , we can say that the entrant has no incentive for imitation. Thus it is better for the incumbent to adopt its technology at the beginning (A=0). In this case, the incumbent will face the competition from the entrant only when the patent expires. 8 
Credible threat of imitation
When condition (3) does not hold, the entrant's gain from imitation exceeds the entrant's cost of imitation. Therefore, the entrant has an incentive to imitate the incumbent's technology, ceteris paribus. However, since the lifetime of the technology is finite, the incumbent can eliminate the threat of imitation by delaying technology adoption. Let A* denote the time at which the entrant's discounted payoff up to N is equal to the imitation cost. So, delaying until at least time A* will prevent any entry of rivals. That is, at . Obviously, the incumbent would needlessly forgo monopoly profits if it 8 We assume that patent life is smaller than the lifecycle of the new technology (P<N), and will not (5) and (6) 
From the conditions in (4) and (7) (where condition (7) If the combinations of the imitation costs and the patent lives fall in the area 0NH then the threat of imitation is credible. Hence, for these values of patent lives and the imitation costs, the incumbent can eliminate the threat of imitation only if it delays its technology adoption up to A*. However, the incumbent will delay its technology only if delay generates more profit to the incumbent than technology adoption at the beginning. The line AB in Figure 1 represents the imitation cost that makes the incumbent indifferent between delayed technology adoption and immediate technology adoption. 9 Therefore, if the combinations of the imitation costs and the patent lives fall in the area ABH then the incumbent does not adopt its technology at the beginning, but adopts its technology at time A*. The term ) , 0 ( M in the Figure 1 highlights that there is no initial production and a monopoly for the incumbent afterwards.
A graphical interpretation
On the other hand, if the combinations of the imitation costs and the patent lives fall in the area 0NBA, then the incumbent does not benefit from the delay strategy. In this area the incumbent is better off if it adopts its technology at the beginning, because the imitation cost is so low that the incumbent has to wait a relatively long period until it eliminates the threat of imitation and receives the benefit from monopoly. Therefore, the industry is characterized by a duopoly in all periods. 
, (i) the incumbent adopts its technology at the beginning provided condition (7) is not satisfied, (ii) the incumbent delays its technology adoption and adopts its
technology at A* provided condition (7) is satisfied. 9 So the line represents
Thus we see that if imitation cost is rather high, imitation is not an attractive option to the entrant, and the incumbent adopts its technology at the beginning. If imitation cost is rather low, delaying tactics are too expensive and so the incumbent adopts immediately while the entrant copies. For imitation costs neither too low nor too high, delaying is attractive when imitation is credible. For the range of imitation cost for which delay is attractive, the amount of delay decreases with imitation cost. The idea is that, since the discounted payoff of the entrant over the patent life covers the imitation cost, the entrant has an incentive for imitation.
The incumbent can eliminate the threat of imitation only by delaying up to a time period that makes the imitation cost equal to the discounted payoff of the entrant. If the imitation cost is relatively high, then the incumbent needs to wait a relatively small period of time in order to eliminate the threat of the imitation. But, for relatively low imitation cost, the incumbent needs to wait a relatively long period in order to eliminate the threat of imitation, which is relatively costly.
Often it is argued that the imitation cost has a positive relationship with patent breadth (e.g., see Gallini, 1992) . Therefore, given that imitation is an attractive option to the entrant, the incentive for delayed technology adoption by the incumbent increases with patent breadth. Further, consistent with Benoit (1985) , a longer patent life leads to a larger incentive to imitate and to a lower payoff to the incumbent, ceteris paribus. In addition we have shown that by delaying the incumbent can lessen the profit loss caused by imitation, but such a delay will only be profitable when the cost of imitation is not too low.
Implications for welfare
The above discussion highlights the possibility of inefficiency arising from the delayed technology adoption by the incumbent. If imitation is an attractive option to the entrant and the incumbent finds it optimal to delay its technology adoption, then it implies no production in the initial periods and a monopoly for the incumbent thereafter. For example, one can look at the points Y and Y′ given in Figure 1 . These points have the same imitation costs, but in Y′ the patent life is longer. At Y, the entrant has no incentive for imitation and so the incumbent adopts its technology at the beginning and enjoys its monopoly up to the patent life. But, at Y′, the incumbent faces the imitation threat and in this situation the incumbent finds it optimal to delay its technology adoption. Therefore, at Y′, there is no production in the initial periods and the incumbent acts as a monopolist in all periods starting from time A*. Thus, it is clear that in this situation, a longer patent life reduces welfare. However, if one considers Q and Q′ then one may find that a longer patent life increases welfare. At Q, imitation is not a credible threat and the incumbent adopts its technology at the beginning, but at Q′ imitation is a credible threat. Therefore, at Q′, the industry becomes a duopoly from the beginning. If the welfare gains from duopoly over monopoly are sufficient to compensate the loss to society from the imitation cost, then a higher welfare is achieved at Q′ rather than at Q. Since the imitation costs are low in the cases where imitation plays a role, it is likely that the condition is satisfied, and hence that welfare increases.
Also, longer patent lives support imitation as a credible threat. However, if one considers two points either above or below the curve OH then we find that in these situations, patent lives, given the cost of imitation, do not have any impact on the decision on technology adoption and hence, have no effect on social welfare. So, this paper confirms one empirical finding which says that patent life may not be an important factor for affecting the incentive for innovation and technology adoption (Mansfield et al., 1981, and Levi et al., 1987 
Licensing
In the previous section we have shown that if imitation is an attractive option to the entrant, then it may induce the incumbent to delay its technology adoption. The purpose of this section is to show that if the incumbent has the licensing option then this may eliminate the incumbent's incentive for delayed technology adoption. Hence, licensing may prevent the incumbent from waiting with technology adoption in order to reap monopoly profits at a later stage.
In the spirit of Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Marjit (1990) we consider a fixed fee licensing. The key argument for considering such a fixed fee is to avoid a free rider problem that may arise when the entrant can imitate costlessly immediately after taking the license.
Alternatively, because of the lack of information necessary to implement any output royalty the incumbent may prefer a fixed fee patent licensing contract. Furthermore, assume that the incumbent will give a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the entrant and the entrant will accept any offer as long as it does not make the entrant worse off.
Moreover, it is assumed that the industry profit decreases when the number of firms competing with the same technology increases. This implies that the monopoly profit, M , is greater than the duopoly industry profit, D 2 . This assumption immediately implies that licensing is not profitable for the incumbent on or after * A . Hence, if there is any licensing then it must be before * A . Following the same logic we can say that the incumbent will never license its technology when imitation is not a credible threat. Therefore, licensing is feasible in all areas in figure 1 except the (M,D) area. In the following two subsections, we will examine two types of licenses, a forward contract on licensing and a 'simple' licensing contract.
Forward contract on licensing
First of all we consider a forward contract on licensing in which the incumbent transfers the technology at a predetermined date in the future. This contract appears to reduce welfare for all combinations of I and P for which imitation is credible and delayed technology adoption is optimal for the incumbent if there were no licensing possibilities. Hence, we consider the area ONBA in Figure . 11 In deriving the region within which licensing is optimal, the assumption of this extreme bargaining structure is not critical. Only for imitation cost such that the incumbent is indifferent between licensing and delaying, the incumbent charges the full surplus from licensing. In all other cases the incumbent and the entrant may bargain over the license agreement as long as Eq. (9) is satisfied, since licensing makes both firms better off. However, the range of I for which licensing is optimal is unaffected. (9) (10) The value of * A is given by equation (4) . Substituting equation (4) into (10) 
No forward contract on licensing
Taking the first derivative with respect to I we find that the value of k decreases as I increases. Therefore, higher imitation cost reduces the incentive for technology adoption and licensing at the beginning compared to delayed technology adoption with no-licensing. The incumbent gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer if it decides technology licensing. Hence, it extracts lifetime surplus generated in the entrant's firm and this licensing fee does not depend on the imitation cost. However, the imitation cost affects the reservation payoff of the incumbent by affecting the value of * A . Higher imitation cost reduces * A and increases the reservation payoff to the incumbent. Thus, it reduces the gain from licensing and technology adoption at the beginning compared to delayed technology adoption with no-licensing. In other words, if without licensing the incumbent needs to wait for a relatively long period in order to get the monopoly benefit then competition throughout the lifetime may be an attractive option to the incumbent provided the future loss from competition is outweighed by the initial licensing fee. Hence, the effectiveness of licensing to eliminate the inefficiency created from delayed technology adoption decreases with higher imitation cost. Further, it is easy to see that both the conditions (7) and (10) . Therefore, we can say that if the cost of imitation is more than I , then the incumbent prefers delayed technology adoption to licensing. Here, due to sufficiently higher costs of imitation the incumbent has to wait relatively shortly in order to eliminate the threat of imitation. Hence, the incumbent can get the monopoly benefit relatively quickly. On the contrary, when I I < , imitation costs are too low to warrant a short optimal delay, and the incumbent opts for licensing. Hence, whereas the forward contract on licensing is welfare improving for Therefore it is worthwhile to consider the impact on our results of the cycletime. First note that the combinations of P and I in which the entrant has no incentive for imitation, as given by condition (3), is unaffected by the cycletime. When N decreases, the line NH shifts to the left, and the lines GH, A′B′, and AB shift downwards. Therefore, the area in which there is a non-credible threat of imitation shrinks at the expense of the area in which there is a credible imitation threat. Hence, for a larger set of feasible combinations of P and I imitation is credible. So the potential loss in welfare as well as the potential gains from licensing become more immediate with shrinking lifecycles.
Discussion
So far we have assumed that the entrant can get the technology only through imitation or through licensing. Now we would like to discuss briefly how the result may be influenced if the entrant can get the production technology through its own R&D process.
We assume that with a given probability density function, the entrant can invent a production technology between the time period 0 and N , and the R&D process requires I R > amount of investment. Further, we assume that if the entrant succeeds in R&D then both firms will operate in the market and get a profit flow of D . 12 First, we look at the implication of the entrant's R&D on the timing of technology adoption without the possibility of licensing. Assume that imitation is a credible threat. If the incumbent adopts its technology at the beginning then it will encourage the entrant to imitate the incumbent's technology instead of doing its own R&D (since R>I) and hence, the incumbent will get a profit flow of D .
On the other hand, if the incumbent wants to delay its technology adoption, now there is a possibility that the entrant will come up with a technology. The incumbent will delay up to point * A , if delay is optimal, because otherwise he is certain that he will not benefit from a delay strategy. Since there is in every period a positive probability that the entrant invents, the incumbent may forgo the benefit from delayed technology adoption. So, R&D by the entrant will reduce the incumbent's expected profit from a delay strategy. Therefore, the incumbent will not employ the delaying strategy if there is a very high probability that the entrant will be able to come up with a technology through its own R&D process. Otherwise, delayed technology adoption can be the optimal strategy for the incumbent. Further, it is easy to understand that the incumbent will prefer the forward contract on licensing even when delayed technology adoption is not optimal under no-licensing. If the incumbent adopts its technology at the beginning then the entrant will always imitate the incumbent's technology rather than doing its own R&D. Hence, in this situation, the reservation payoffs of these firms remain same compared to a situation where the entrant does not have option for its own R&D. So, the incumbent will prefer to license its technology free of charge but, will allow the entrant to use this technology from ) (
In the previous section we have considered the possibility of a simple licensing contract where it takes a licensing fee at the beginning and allows the entrant to use the technology from the beginning in the case that a forward contract on licensing is not feasible.
If the incumbent prefers to adopt the technology at the beginning if there is no licensing, then it does not change the reservation payoff of the firms and hence, the possibility of licensing does not affect the incumbent's incentive for simple licensing contract. But, if the incumbent prefers delayed technology adoption without any licensing contract then, like forward contract on licensing, the possibility of successful R&D by the incumbent increases the reservation payoff of the entrant and therefore, reduces the licensing fee. The possibility of R&D, on the other hand, also reduces the incumbent's payoff from delayed technology adoption. However, the possibility of invention by the entrant reduces the expected monopoly profit of the incumbent under no-licensing whereas it reduces the licensing fee by the expected duopoly profit minus the cost of doing R&D. So, the possibility of R&D by the entrant increases the incumbent incentive for this simple licensing contract.
Conclusion
In this paper we consider technology adoption by an incumbent when it faces the threat of imitation from an entrant. If patent life is sufficiently short, the threat of imitation is not credible and the incumbent always adopts its technology at the beginning. However, in the case of a relatively long patent life, imitation becomes a credible threat, and the incumbent may prefer to delay its technology adoption. This delaying strategy helps to eliminate the threat of competition by making imitation unattractive to the entrant. Thus, a relatively large patent protection may create an inefficiency by encouraging the incumbent to delay its technology adoption.
When the incumbent is enabled to license the technology, the incumbent will prefer to engage in a forward contract on licensing. Under this forward contract on licensing, the incumbent takes a licensing fee at the beginning and allows the entrant to use the technology from a pre-specified time period. While this licensing contract is optimal for the incumbent, it can reduce social welfare if the incumbent does not prefer to delay its technology adoption without licensing.
However, if the forward contract on licensing is not feasible then the incumbent may prefer adopting and licensing its technology at the beginning to delaying technology adoption.
Especially in the case of relatively strong patent protection and low imitation cost, licensing enhances welfare by eliminating the incidence of unwanted imitation cost by the entrant and by creating competition from scratch. On the other hand, licensing will never be optimal under relatively weak patent protection and high cost of imitation. In this case the entrant will prefer to wait until the patent expires.
The possibility of R&D by the entrant, however, reduces the incumbent's incentive for delayed technology adoption and may increase the incentive for simple licensing contract.
However, the incumbent always has the incentive for forward contract on licensing.
Considering the recent surge in internet-dominated technologies where lifecycles are short and imitation costs are low, instant copying is likely to occur frequently. In order to save the deadweight loss from imitation, the results call for licensing agreements between the innovator and potential entrants. Moreover, licensing will encourage adoption of slightly more complex technologies, such as computer hardware, where delay of technology adoption would be optimal without licensing agreements. However, if the entrant has the possibility to invent a technology through its own R&D then this will reduce the incentive for delayed strategy and may reduce the licensing fee extracted by the incumbent, if licensing occurs. 
